This article was published on October 31, 2006 in the Daily Mirror, Colombo. If you are a subscriber it is accessible at
http://www.dailymirror.lk/2006/10/31/opinion/01.asp.) It is reproduced here with the author's permission.
GENEVA FAILURE CALLS FOR NEW NEGOTIATION APPROACH
--Jehan Perera
The failure of the government and LTTE delegations to agree to anything, or to even meet again, comes as a very big blow to the expectations that people were having for peace, especially in the north east. The high cost of the military approaches of the two sides in recent times made the Geneva talks important as the quickest way to a less costly option of conflict resolution and easing the sufferings of the people. But unfortunately the inflexibility of the two sides scuttled that hope. Perhaps due to their mistrust, perhaps due to their insistence on sticking to their positions, they failed to deal with the main issue for which they should have been meeting, which was the interest of the people.
At the opening of the talks, Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim correctly summarized the three main issues facing the parties. He said these were the humanitarian issues concerning the people, stopping violence and a political solution. But at the talks the LTTE stuck rigidly to their position that the A9 highway to Jaffna had to be opened as the way to ensure humanitarian access to the people of the north and this was the only issue they wished to talk about. They did not wish to discuss any other issue other than that of the re-opening of the highway. On the other hand, the government took the position that the core issues relating to the political solution needed to be discussed at the talks.
With both parties taking up strong positions, and refusing to budge from their positions, the most important issues of humanitarian assistance to the conflict-affected people and ending the violence were not discussed. There are alternatives to the A9 highway in getting humanitarian assistance to the people of the north. Even if not as satisfactory as the land route, the government did supply the north with food and essential supplies by sea during the period 1995-2001 when the A9 highway was closed by the LTTE. The opening of the A9 highway would do little or nothing to ease the plight of the conflict-affected people in the east, which is far from the A9 highway. Addressing the issue of humanitarian welfare also includes upholding the Ceasefire Agreement in all its aspects.
It is also puzzling why the two parties could not agree to discuss the issue of the re-opening of the A9 highway, humanitarian assistance, the upholding of the Ceasefire Agreement and core issues as one package when they were meeting for two whole days. For instance, the government and LTTE could have agreed to talk about each of these issues for two hours each. If they could not satisfactorily conclude their discussions, they would have had a strong motivation to meet at an early date to take up the unfinished business. If problem solving was the real need, there was no need to get stuck on insisting on a one item meeting.
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
There is no question that talks that are meant to be successful should be within a framework, and not open ended. When talks are open ended with no agreed destination, the journey can go round in a circle. One of the reasons for the failure of the Ceasefire Agreement was because it was not located within an agreed political framework. Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim’s proposal at the outset of the talks, that they should be within the framework of the previous six rounds of talks held by the government and LTTE during the period of the UNP government and also within the framework of the last round of Geneva talks in February was in accordance with this reality.
At present there is little or no trust between the government and LTTE and other relevant parties, such as other Tamil parties and Muslim parties. Compounding this lack of trust is the political vacuum that exists in terms of an agreed political framework within which the ethnic conflict will be resolved. The lack of trust and lack of a political framework both explains and leads to the continuing efforts to obtain a position of strength vis a vis the others.
It is highly unlikely that there will be full adherence to the Ceasefire and Geneva Agreements until the government and LTTE agree on a broad political framework. The political framework agreement would set out the scope for economic development and political control. In other words, an end to the deadlock in political talks is necessary.
The government-UNP alliance may hold the answer to the need for a new approach to the peace process, to identify a satisfactory power sharing framework and to dealing with the LTTE’s approach to the peace talks. There is a need for the government to draw upon the expertise of UNP members, such as Prof. G.L. Peiris in fashioning a workable approach to negotiations with the LTTE that builds upon shared interests rather than on divisive positions.
It is also evident that the absence of the LTTE’s former chief negotiator, Dr Anton Balasinham from these talks contributed to the rigidity of the LTTE stance. Amongst the LTTE negotiators only Dr Balasingham would have had the breadth of vision to realize that peace talks cannot be sustainable outside of a political framework. It was during his stewardship of the LTTE negotiating team that the greatest breakthrough to a mutually acceptable political framework was obtained in the oft quoted Oslo Declaration of December 2002 that called for a federal solution that accepted the right of internal self determination in the north east of the country.
NEW APPROACH
It was unrealistic to expect a breakthrough at the Geneva talks. But it was reasonable to expect the two sides to agree to dates to meet again after putting across their different points of view on this occasion. But even this did not happen, making clear the fact that the two sides have a great deal of work to do to regain any measure of goodwill and trust in one another. In this regard the abiding memory of a successful charting of a new beginning would be the first round of talks that took place in Sattahip, Thailand in September 2002. Prof. G.L. Peiris led the government delegation and Dr Anton Balasingham led the LTTE delegation.
In their public statements to the media these two chief negotiators at the 2002 peace talks addressed the shared future they hoped to bring about through their meeting, rather than lay emphasis on the bitter and bloody past that divided them. When they faced a barrage of questions by skeptical journalists, they appeared to even defend each other. By way of contrast on this occasion the government and LTTE delegations appeared to follow the model that they had practiced at the last round of Geneva talks in February 2006. Both sides recounted the wrongs they perceived in the other side, while remaining silent about their own side’s misdeeds.
Unfortunately the government’s new alliance with the opposition UNP did not seem to have made any significant impact on the negotiating approach or spirit of the government team. But President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s decision to invite the UNP to join his government was born out of his recognition for a new approach to resolving the ethnic conflict. The President did not invite the UNP to join because he was feeling politically weak. On the contrary the President invited the UNP and signed the bipartisan agreement with them at a time he was, and remains, politically very popular amongst the majority of the electorate. The rationale for the President’s invitation to the UNP to solve the ethnic conflict now needs to be changed into action.
There is a case to be made for the UNP to become a formal partner in a power sharing arrangement with the government for a temporary period, until the framework of a political solution with the LTTE is agreed upon. There is a need for a new vision of partnership and goodwill in the peace process. There is a need for local and international pressure that would make the government give more sincere attention to pressing humanitarian issues and the LTTE to address core political issues instead to seeking to dodge them by making various excuses.
