If the opening of the A9 Highway was one of the reasons the last round of negotiations in Geneva failed, the conditional reopening of the highway proposed by the government this week has proven as contentious.
Sri Lanka to open road to Jaffna, BBC News, November 20, 2006.
Rebels reject Sri Lanka President aid convoy plan, Reuters Alert, November 20, 2006
Rohan Samarajiva, If Only………… Choices: Going North or Going South? Lanka Business Online, November 22, 2006.
Opening A9 imperative to avoid humanitarian crisis, Bishop tells Envoys, TamilNet, November 21, 2006.
Positive Action is Required in Both Humanitarian and Human Rights Spheres, National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, November 21, 2006.
Jehan Perera, Internally Generated Approach is Better for Conflict Resolution, November 20, 2006.
See also The Road To Peace: Life along the A9, a National Peace Council project.
On the question of recruitment of children:
Wilson Gnanadass, ‘We fully support Rock’s statements’- Helen [Olafsdottir], The Nation on Sunday, November 19, 2006.
Worth reading:
Nira Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka: the politics of purity, Open Democracy, November 17, 2006.
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
Maldives Update, November 22, 2006
Superstar’s holiday paradise notorious for human rights abuses, Index on Censorship, no date.
Mujey, EU to impose sanctions against Maldives, Haama News, November 21, 2006.
Donim, Has the international community sold out to Gayoom? Maldives Today, November 13, 2006.
In the meanwhile, anxiety about the November 10 detainees (including the boat detainees) is mounting.
Mariyam Mohamed, The One & Only Dhoonidhoo Diet, Dhivehi Observer,
November 22, 2006.
Mujey, EU to impose sanctions against Maldives, Haama News, November 21, 2006.
Donim, Has the international community sold out to Gayoom? Maldives Today, November 13, 2006.
In the meanwhile, anxiety about the November 10 detainees (including the boat detainees) is mounting.
Mariyam Mohamed, The One & Only Dhoonidhoo Diet, Dhivehi Observer,
November 22, 2006.
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
Maldives Update, November 21, 2006
Paul Moorcraft, Island democracy, Washington Times, November 20, 2006.
The Dhivehi Observer has started a series called "Chronicles of 10/11 Heroes." For students of politics, it is an illustration of how overreaction can cause an ordinary, albeit political act (in this instance, protest) to acquire epic proportions. A large protest rally is not usually the stuff of future legends; it becomes that when it evokes a certain magnitude of state response.
The distance between Page 3 and Page 1 is amply illustrated by this news, reported worldwide.
The Dhivehi Observer has started a series called "Chronicles of 10/11 Heroes." For students of politics, it is an illustration of how overreaction can cause an ordinary, albeit political act (in this instance, protest) to acquire epic proportions. A large protest rally is not usually the stuff of future legends; it becomes that when it evokes a certain magnitude of state response.
The distance between Page 3 and Page 1 is amply illustrated by this news, reported worldwide.
Monday, November 20, 2006
Maldivian Boat Crisis Detainees, November 20, 2006
Some news, and not at all good, about Ameen Faisal who was on the dhoni that was intercepted and harrassed on its way to the capital.
Mariyam Mohamed, Ameen Faisal on Hunger Strike: Four young children about to lose their Father, Dhivehi Observer, November 20, 2006.
Faisal was nominated to the MDP Shadow Cabinet just last week. He is a high-profile prisoner and suffering this fate. What is the fate of those who are not as well-known?
Other news on that page that is being copied here because there is no way to link:
Some key reformists transferred to house arrest
Male' - Sources within MDP have confirmed that Mohamed Ziyad (Ziattey), Majeed Sir and Siddeeq have been transferred to house arrested after more than two weeks in solitary confinement. They were arrested unlawfully by the despotic regime of Gayyoom in an attempt to stop the planned protest of '10th November' calling for faster constitutional reform. In other developments, popular youth reformist Umar (Jinsey) has been freed but concern is mounting over fate of some reformists who are still on hunger strike, especially Ameen Faisal and others from the Addu boat who were taken hostage by the regime.
Mariyam Mohamed, Ameen Faisal on Hunger Strike: Four young children about to lose their Father, Dhivehi Observer, November 20, 2006.
Faisal was nominated to the MDP Shadow Cabinet just last week. He is a high-profile prisoner and suffering this fate. What is the fate of those who are not as well-known?
Other news on that page that is being copied here because there is no way to link:
Some key reformists transferred to house arrest
Male' - Sources within MDP have confirmed that Mohamed Ziyad (Ziattey), Majeed Sir and Siddeeq have been transferred to house arrested after more than two weeks in solitary confinement. They were arrested unlawfully by the despotic regime of Gayyoom in an attempt to stop the planned protest of '10th November' calling for faster constitutional reform. In other developments, popular youth reformist Umar (Jinsey) has been freed but concern is mounting over fate of some reformists who are still on hunger strike, especially Ameen Faisal and others from the Addu boat who were taken hostage by the regime.
Friday, November 17, 2006
Maldives Update, November 17, 2006
Yesterday, it was observed that there was no news about how the November 10 detainees were faring. Today, there is.
MDP Members Hospitalised Due To Hunger Strike, Minivan News, November 16, 2006.
MDP Members Hospitalised Due To Hunger Strike, Minivan News, November 16, 2006.
Thursday, November 16, 2006
Maldives, November 16, 2006
The acting president of the Maldivian Democratic Party has been charged with high treason. Ironically, Ibrahim Hussain Zaki has been the face of the Maldives for many members of the South Asian political elite, who have worked with him in many contexts, having represented Maldives in various capacities and served as the Secretary-General of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
There is no further news of those detained in anticipation of the November 10, 2006 rally. Some of the passengers on the boat were teenagers and more than a week later it is not clear how they are faring. Further, the island prison (Dhoonidhoo) that is being used does not have a reputation for humane treatment of prisoners. Solitary confinement and torture have both been reported in the past. With access to lawyers, medicines and visitors not being reported, it is hoped that the international spotlight on Maldivian political affairs is serving as a protection to political prisoners in this time of crisis.
There is no further news of those detained in anticipation of the November 10, 2006 rally. Some of the passengers on the boat were teenagers and more than a week later it is not clear how they are faring. Further, the island prison (Dhoonidhoo) that is being used does not have a reputation for humane treatment of prisoners. Solitary confinement and torture have both been reported in the past. With access to lawyers, medicines and visitors not being reported, it is hoped that the international spotlight on Maldivian political affairs is serving as a protection to political prisoners in this time of crisis.
Sri Lankan children and the conflict, November 16, 2006
Over the years, the LTTE's recruitment of child soldiers has consistently criticised. This week, the Special Advisor to the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict provoked sharp reactions by accusing the Sri Lankan government of allowing Karuna's group to recruit children by abducting them.
UN adviser finds Sri Lanka’s children ‘at risk from all sides’ in the bloody conflict, UN News Centre, November 14, 2006.
Also reported as:
B. Muralidhar Reddy, Colombo aiding Karuna: U.N., The Hindu, November 14, 2006.
Sri Lankan reactions, within and outside Sri Lanka:
B. Muralidhar Reddy, In Sri Lanka, children at risk, The Hindu, November 16, 2006.
***
And here is why Sri Lanka's conflict is not just Sri Lanka's problem, and why conflicts are about more than differences of perspective and the use of violence. This article is a description of the displacement caused by the escalating hostilities in Sri Lanka.
Daniel Pepper, India's beaches are bellwether of Sri Lanka's war, Christian Science Monitor, November 16, 2006.
This partly accounts for the growing feeling on both sides of the Palk Straits that India needs to take an active interest in the peace process.
UN adviser finds Sri Lanka’s children ‘at risk from all sides’ in the bloody conflict, UN News Centre, November 14, 2006.
Also reported as:
B. Muralidhar Reddy, Colombo aiding Karuna: U.N., The Hindu, November 14, 2006.
Sri Lankan reactions, within and outside Sri Lanka:
- UN Advisor's Conclusions About Government Involvement In Child Recruits, Ludicrous! LankaWeb, November 13, 2006.
- Govt. to order high level probe regarding UN allegation of child recruit says Defence spokesman, November 14, 2006.
- UN Rock repeats Tiger accusations - Karuna Group, Asian Tribune, November 16, 2006.
- Sonali Samarasinghe, Is MR crying crocodile tears for Lanka's children? - Allan Rock's Sri Lanka, TamilCanadian.com (Courtesy: Morning Leader),November 15, 2006.
- Walter Jayawardhana, Sri Lanka’s leading author Gunadasa Amarasekera says United Nation’s Alan Rock lied against Sri Lanka about child soldiers, Asian Tribune, November 16, 2006.
And this:
Military: Tamil rebels using civilians as human shields; soldier, civilians killed, International Herald Tribune, November 15, 2006.
Outside Sri Lanka:B. Muralidhar Reddy, In Sri Lanka, children at risk, The Hindu, November 16, 2006.
***
And here is why Sri Lanka's conflict is not just Sri Lanka's problem, and why conflicts are about more than differences of perspective and the use of violence. This article is a description of the displacement caused by the escalating hostilities in Sri Lanka.
Daniel Pepper, India's beaches are bellwether of Sri Lanka's war, Christian Science Monitor, November 16, 2006.
This partly accounts for the growing feeling on both sides of the Palk Straits that India needs to take an active interest in the peace process.
Wednesday, November 15, 2006
Maldives Update, November 15, 2006
Sudha Ramachandran, Gayoom’s misuse of Indian help? Deccan Herald, November 15, 2006.
Monday, November 13, 2006
Sri Lanka: Raviraj assassination
Sri Lankan MP killed in Colombo, BBC News, November 10, 2006.
Vindya Amaranayake and Anurangi Singh, Massive demo for Raviraj, Nation on Sunday, November 12, 2006.
Violent cult: Bring it to book, Nation on Sunday, November 12, 2006.
***
November 14 addition: Statement by Civil Society Organizations on the Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns, Colombo, November 14, 2006.
***
Most of Sri Lanka's leading newspapers are online but access to articles is restricted to paid subscribers. Hence, our inability to link to more commentary by Sri Lankan observers. With Jehan Perera's permission, we are copying his views here:
----------------------------------------------
Jehan Perera
THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IS ESCALATION
November 13, 2006
The month of November is awaited with trepidation in times of war, because it is the month that LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan makes his annual address. This is a time of war, even if limited and undeclared, and the run-up to Mr Pirapaharan’s Heroes Day speech has been anything but positive. The past few days have seen firing on schools in LTTE-controlled areas that housed internally displaced persons causing heavy casualties, naval battles that killed dozens, and now the assassination of a prominent Member of Parliament of the Tamil National Alliance, Nadaraja Raviraj, who represented the Jaffna District. The stage has been set for the announcement, if not actual occurrence, of a deadly escalation of violence. Already notices have appeared of retaliation.
The logic of violence is more violence on the premise that violence begets violence. In the absence of successful initiatives to resolve the ethnic conflict by negotiations, the use of violence has been the dominant mode of conflict resolution. While the practice of state repression and of Tamil militancy over the past two decades testifies to this grim reality, the silencing of contrary voices has been the primary preserve of the LTTE. Its claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil people has led to much blood being spilled in the pursuit of that goal.
Ever since the assassination of Alfred Duraiappah, the Mayor of Jaffna, in 1975, allegedly by a group that included the LTTE leader, the LTTE has had a horrendous track record of killing those within the Tamil community that thought differently. Even during the most peaceful period of the Ceasefire Agreement, the residual fear of the LTTE’s treatment of those who thought differently and critically about them remained. During visits to the north east it was evident that nearly all people were unwilling to say anything critical of the LTTE in public, but some of them would be critical in private. There was no such constraint when it came to the government.
There can be no doubt that the people’s willingness to be critical of the government derived from the wrongs committed by the government. But the willingness to be bold in criticism of the government also stemmed from a degree of confidence in the democratic structure of the government that made its power holders more accountable and permitted dissent. However, it now appears that an equivalent change has taken place and the LTTE’s methodology to silence those who dissent is being emulated by those who oppose that very practice.
FIGHTING FIRE
The assassination of Raviraj follows a large number of killings and abductions for ransom that have taken place in government-controlled territory, including the capital. Despite many of these incidents being within high security zones, the perpetrators have been able to get away on a regular basis. This has given rise to the reasonable inference that there is collaboration with sections of the government’s security apparatus that deals with counter-terrorism. This fighting of fire with fire will tend to have the effect of silencing the pro-LTTE voices from within the Tamil community, as much as earlier there was a silencing of the anti-LTTE voices within the Tamil community.
Raviraj was a Tamil leader who helped to educate the non Tamil population about the perspectives of the Tamils and their sufferings. On Tuesday November 14 he had agreed to be a speaker at a Religious-Political Dialogue organised by several civic organisations. He was friendly with all, and always prepared to engage with others, even with those of a very different political mind set. Although the Sinhala language skills at his disposal were limited, he courageously made use of them to debate the representatives of the nationalist Sinhalese political parties and provide another perspective on current and national issues. With his killing this important avenue of information is likely to close for both the general public and the international community to whom he spoke with a measure of credibility.
It was perhaps not coincidental that the day before his assassination, Raviraj had played an important role in the demonstration by MPs belonging to the Tamil National Alliance in front of the UN office complex. They protested against the humanitarian crisis that has engulfed the north east, primarily its Tamil-inhabited parts. Those who took part in the demonstration lay the blame for the crisis on the government while sparing the LTTE. But whether it is the food crisis or the civilian casualties from military action, the LTTE hand in making the crisis worse cannot be denied. But this is what is glossed over in the propaganda war. For instance, the TNA protested against the government’s refusal to open the A9 highway to Jaffna to supply the civilian population with essential supplies. But they had nothing to say about the LTTE’s refusal to permit the ICRC and UN from taking those supplies to Jaffna by sea.
Another of the issues that the TNA group raised in their protest was the tragic event that took place in Vakarai in the east. Long range artillery fire from government-controlled territory had slammed into LTTE-held territory and hit two schools in which civilians displaced due to previous fighting had been housed with dozens of deaths and a large number in the hundreds being injured. Although the military claimed that they retaliated against artillery fire directed against them from the direction of the schools, the government has been severely condemned for this incident. While the international monitors contradicted this claim by the military, an international news agency has carried a story that confirms the military version.
POSSIBILITY
Raviraj, as a TNA member, took up public stances that often corresponded to the LTTE’s position. One of the charges levelled against the TNA has been that it is either unwilling or unable to take up public stances that are different from those of the LTTE. One inference is that the LTTE’s positions are also those of the Tamil people which the TNA is mandated to politically represent. The opposing inference is that the TNA, like other unarmed Tamil organisations that work out in the open, has to be deferential to the viewpoint of the LTTE if they are to be spared their lives.
The message of the Raviraj assassination is that there is, and will be, countervailing terror unless a new approach to conflict resolution is charted. This will now mean that the pro-LTTE Tamil voice will also be silenced whereas in the past it was the anti-LTTE Tamil voice that was silenced. In this situation, only those in the middle who make bland non-committal statements, or those who say nothing at all, will be able to survive. Or they will have to speak privately and hope that someone will take notice.
Like this letter I received from an elderly person from Jaffna. In quaint language he wrote, “Now in Jaffna everything has worsened. Famine, hunger and thirst, poverty, LTTE-Army fighting one another, cost of living has gone up, acute shortage of food items, every field and walk of life affected, at a standstill, collapsed, neglected. The innocent men, women, youngsters, patients, handicapped persons, destitutes, dogs, cats etc have to undergo much hardships and grievances… The political leaders, JVP, are playing with fire since 1957, especially from 1977 onwards. Large sums of money are squandered on weapons without solving the ethnic problem. I know the LTTE is following the wrong path and pushing the innocent Tamils to poverty…”
But as the assassination of Raviraj shows, it is not only the LTTE that is taking the wrong path. There is the possibility that the killing of Raviraj will jolt the political establishment into realising that the culture of killing is not going to solve the country’s problems. The fact that the JVP, whose political philosophy on the ethnic conflict is opposed to that of the TNA, also condemned the killing indicates a closing of ranks. Perhaps the politicians who cannot agree on virtually anything will now agree on the necessity of a cessation of all violence before the rising tide of violence claims more valuable lives. As the Anti War Front’s mass protest against the Raviraj killing stated, join the march for the right to live, live and let live, because nothing is more important than life.
----------------------------------------------
Other:
Dilip Ganguly, Sri Lanka endures a war neither side acknowledges, AP/Mercury News, November 12, 2006.
Irfan Husain, Letter from London: Driven away by the Tigers, Daily Times, November 13, 2006.
Peter App, WITNESS: Waking up paralyzed in Sri Lanka's war zone, Reuters, November 10, 2006.
Vindya Amaranayake and Anurangi Singh, Massive demo for Raviraj, Nation on Sunday, November 12, 2006.
Violent cult: Bring it to book, Nation on Sunday, November 12, 2006.
***
November 14 addition: Statement by Civil Society Organizations on the Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns, Colombo, November 14, 2006.
***
Most of Sri Lanka's leading newspapers are online but access to articles is restricted to paid subscribers. Hence, our inability to link to more commentary by Sri Lankan observers. With Jehan Perera's permission, we are copying his views here:
----------------------------------------------
Jehan Perera
THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IS ESCALATION
November 13, 2006
The month of November is awaited with trepidation in times of war, because it is the month that LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan makes his annual address. This is a time of war, even if limited and undeclared, and the run-up to Mr Pirapaharan’s Heroes Day speech has been anything but positive. The past few days have seen firing on schools in LTTE-controlled areas that housed internally displaced persons causing heavy casualties, naval battles that killed dozens, and now the assassination of a prominent Member of Parliament of the Tamil National Alliance, Nadaraja Raviraj, who represented the Jaffna District. The stage has been set for the announcement, if not actual occurrence, of a deadly escalation of violence. Already notices have appeared of retaliation.
The logic of violence is more violence on the premise that violence begets violence. In the absence of successful initiatives to resolve the ethnic conflict by negotiations, the use of violence has been the dominant mode of conflict resolution. While the practice of state repression and of Tamil militancy over the past two decades testifies to this grim reality, the silencing of contrary voices has been the primary preserve of the LTTE. Its claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil people has led to much blood being spilled in the pursuit of that goal.
Ever since the assassination of Alfred Duraiappah, the Mayor of Jaffna, in 1975, allegedly by a group that included the LTTE leader, the LTTE has had a horrendous track record of killing those within the Tamil community that thought differently. Even during the most peaceful period of the Ceasefire Agreement, the residual fear of the LTTE’s treatment of those who thought differently and critically about them remained. During visits to the north east it was evident that nearly all people were unwilling to say anything critical of the LTTE in public, but some of them would be critical in private. There was no such constraint when it came to the government.
There can be no doubt that the people’s willingness to be critical of the government derived from the wrongs committed by the government. But the willingness to be bold in criticism of the government also stemmed from a degree of confidence in the democratic structure of the government that made its power holders more accountable and permitted dissent. However, it now appears that an equivalent change has taken place and the LTTE’s methodology to silence those who dissent is being emulated by those who oppose that very practice.
FIGHTING FIRE
The assassination of Raviraj follows a large number of killings and abductions for ransom that have taken place in government-controlled territory, including the capital. Despite many of these incidents being within high security zones, the perpetrators have been able to get away on a regular basis. This has given rise to the reasonable inference that there is collaboration with sections of the government’s security apparatus that deals with counter-terrorism. This fighting of fire with fire will tend to have the effect of silencing the pro-LTTE voices from within the Tamil community, as much as earlier there was a silencing of the anti-LTTE voices within the Tamil community.
Raviraj was a Tamil leader who helped to educate the non Tamil population about the perspectives of the Tamils and their sufferings. On Tuesday November 14 he had agreed to be a speaker at a Religious-Political Dialogue organised by several civic organisations. He was friendly with all, and always prepared to engage with others, even with those of a very different political mind set. Although the Sinhala language skills at his disposal were limited, he courageously made use of them to debate the representatives of the nationalist Sinhalese political parties and provide another perspective on current and national issues. With his killing this important avenue of information is likely to close for both the general public and the international community to whom he spoke with a measure of credibility.
It was perhaps not coincidental that the day before his assassination, Raviraj had played an important role in the demonstration by MPs belonging to the Tamil National Alliance in front of the UN office complex. They protested against the humanitarian crisis that has engulfed the north east, primarily its Tamil-inhabited parts. Those who took part in the demonstration lay the blame for the crisis on the government while sparing the LTTE. But whether it is the food crisis or the civilian casualties from military action, the LTTE hand in making the crisis worse cannot be denied. But this is what is glossed over in the propaganda war. For instance, the TNA protested against the government’s refusal to open the A9 highway to Jaffna to supply the civilian population with essential supplies. But they had nothing to say about the LTTE’s refusal to permit the ICRC and UN from taking those supplies to Jaffna by sea.
Another of the issues that the TNA group raised in their protest was the tragic event that took place in Vakarai in the east. Long range artillery fire from government-controlled territory had slammed into LTTE-held territory and hit two schools in which civilians displaced due to previous fighting had been housed with dozens of deaths and a large number in the hundreds being injured. Although the military claimed that they retaliated against artillery fire directed against them from the direction of the schools, the government has been severely condemned for this incident. While the international monitors contradicted this claim by the military, an international news agency has carried a story that confirms the military version.
POSSIBILITY
Raviraj, as a TNA member, took up public stances that often corresponded to the LTTE’s position. One of the charges levelled against the TNA has been that it is either unwilling or unable to take up public stances that are different from those of the LTTE. One inference is that the LTTE’s positions are also those of the Tamil people which the TNA is mandated to politically represent. The opposing inference is that the TNA, like other unarmed Tamil organisations that work out in the open, has to be deferential to the viewpoint of the LTTE if they are to be spared their lives.
The message of the Raviraj assassination is that there is, and will be, countervailing terror unless a new approach to conflict resolution is charted. This will now mean that the pro-LTTE Tamil voice will also be silenced whereas in the past it was the anti-LTTE Tamil voice that was silenced. In this situation, only those in the middle who make bland non-committal statements, or those who say nothing at all, will be able to survive. Or they will have to speak privately and hope that someone will take notice.
Like this letter I received from an elderly person from Jaffna. In quaint language he wrote, “Now in Jaffna everything has worsened. Famine, hunger and thirst, poverty, LTTE-Army fighting one another, cost of living has gone up, acute shortage of food items, every field and walk of life affected, at a standstill, collapsed, neglected. The innocent men, women, youngsters, patients, handicapped persons, destitutes, dogs, cats etc have to undergo much hardships and grievances… The political leaders, JVP, are playing with fire since 1957, especially from 1977 onwards. Large sums of money are squandered on weapons without solving the ethnic problem. I know the LTTE is following the wrong path and pushing the innocent Tamils to poverty…”
But as the assassination of Raviraj shows, it is not only the LTTE that is taking the wrong path. There is the possibility that the killing of Raviraj will jolt the political establishment into realising that the culture of killing is not going to solve the country’s problems. The fact that the JVP, whose political philosophy on the ethnic conflict is opposed to that of the TNA, also condemned the killing indicates a closing of ranks. Perhaps the politicians who cannot agree on virtually anything will now agree on the necessity of a cessation of all violence before the rising tide of violence claims more valuable lives. As the Anti War Front’s mass protest against the Raviraj killing stated, join the march for the right to live, live and let live, because nothing is more important than life.
----------------------------------------------
Other:
Dilip Ganguly, Sri Lanka endures a war neither side acknowledges, AP/Mercury News, November 12, 2006.
Irfan Husain, Letter from London: Driven away by the Tigers, Daily Times, November 13, 2006.
Peter App, WITNESS: Waking up paralyzed in Sri Lanka's war zone, Reuters, November 10, 2006.
Maldives: Catching their breath? 11-13-06
While exchanging recriminations, both sides are quoted as being ready for dialogue.
Government Calls For “Peaceful Dialogue” With MDP, Minivan News, November 12, 2006.
Government Calls For “Peaceful Dialogue” With MDP, Minivan News, November 12, 2006.
Sunday, November 12, 2006
Maldives Boat Crisis Update, November 12, 2006
‘Namoona’ passengers exposed as wanted criminals, Haveeru, November 12, 2006.
Also:
Zaki to Form New Shadow Cabinet, Minivan News, November 11, 2006.
Also:
Zaki to Form New Shadow Cabinet, Minivan News, November 11, 2006.
Maldives Boat Crisis Update, November 12, 2006
‘Namoona’ passengers exposed as wanted criminals, Haveeru, November 12, 2006.
Also:
Zaki to Form New Shadow Cabinet, Minivan News, November 11, 2006.
Also:
Zaki to Form New Shadow Cabinet, Minivan News, November 11, 2006.
Saturday, November 11, 2006
Southern India, Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep Islands: UPDATE
The 'catch-up' edition of Subcontinent South last week focused on Sri Lanka and the Maldives. This quick survey includes some news from southern India and India's island territories, and does not pretend to 'catch up' at all!
Sanjib Kumar Roy, India plans transhipment port at Great Nicobar, Reuters, October 11, 2006.
Sudha Ramachandran, India navy drops another anchor, Asia Times, October 17, 2006. (Refers to Vishakhapatnam)
Animesh Roul, Terror Down South: India Battles Terrorist Threats Beyond J & K, Counterterrorism Blog, October 29, 2006.
Airports on alert due to bomb threat, Financial Express, November 10, 2006.
India: The Threat of Militant Attacks on India's High-Tech Sector, StratFor.com, October 27, 2006.
The Mullaperiyar dam dispute between Tamil Nadu and Kerala was discussed.
Dam issue: All-party meet concludes, CNN-IBN, October 23, 2006.
Kerala welcomes Tamil Nadu gesture on Mullaperiyar issue, Zee News, October 23, 2006.
Sanjib Kumar Roy, India plans transhipment port at Great Nicobar, Reuters, October 11, 2006.
Sudha Ramachandran, India navy drops another anchor, Asia Times, October 17, 2006. (Refers to Vishakhapatnam)
Animesh Roul, Terror Down South: India Battles Terrorist Threats Beyond J & K, Counterterrorism Blog, October 29, 2006.
Airports on alert due to bomb threat, Financial Express, November 10, 2006.
India: The Threat of Militant Attacks on India's High-Tech Sector, StratFor.com, October 27, 2006.
The Mullaperiyar dam dispute between Tamil Nadu and Kerala was discussed.
Dam issue: All-party meet concludes, CNN-IBN, October 23, 2006.
Kerala welcomes Tamil Nadu gesture on Mullaperiyar issue, Zee News, October 23, 2006.
Maldives Update, November 11, 2006
The first comment published this morning reports yet another encounter between the army and protestors last night (see comments for Maldives Boat Crisis Update, November 9, 2006 (2)). So does the Dhivehi Observer.
Sue Turton, Crackdown in the Maldives, Channel 4 News, November 10, 2006. (includes link to video).
Sue Turton, Crackdown in the Maldives, Channel 4 News, November 10, 2006. (includes link to video).
Friday, November 10, 2006
Sri Lanka Update, November 1-11, 2006.
Mutual hostilities are escalating in Sri Lanka at a steady rhythm. Analyses of the failure of the Geneva talks continue to appear in the press.
Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, The Beginning of the End ? The Morning Leader, November 1, 2006.
Dharisha Bastians, “Geneva II was more graceful” The Nation on Sunday, November 5, 2006.
Vindya Amaranayake, Where do we go from here? Interview with Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe, The Nation on Sunday, November 5, 2006.Future Talks with New Spirit and Approach Must Take Place Soon, National Peace Council, November 2, 2006.
B. Muralidhar Reddy, From bad to worse, Frontline, Volume 23 - Issue 22 :: Nov. 04-17, 2006.
The opening of Route A9 was one of the issues that broke the Geneva Talks two weeks ago.
Alternative route for Jaffna A-9 road, Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence, November 9, 2006.
Jehan Perera, Opening the A9 Highway can also open the road to peace, National Peace Council, November. 06, 2006.
The Supreme Court order on demerging the Northeastern Province remained in the news, with the Prime Minister asserting that the Supreme Court cannot be disregarded.
What have been the consequences of the escalation of hostilities?
Over 200,000 Sri Lankans displaced since April, says UNHCR, Colombo Page, November 8, 2006.
Francis Mead, Nutrition survey checks on health of children affected by conflict in Sri Lanka, UNICEF/ ReliefWeb, November 1, 2006.
Sri Lanka: UN official calls on all sides to protect civilians after deadly army shelling, UN News Centre, November 9, 2006.
See also, the National Peace Council's studies on the costs of war.
Some interesting developments including a statement by the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister on India's Sri Lanka policy.
Time for rethink on Sri Lanka: Karunanidhi, The Hindu, November 10, 2006.
Also:
Alok Bansal, Why India must act in Lanka, Rediff.com, November 1, 2006.
Lankan President to visit India, NDTV.com, November 4, 2006.
Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, The Beginning of the End ? The Morning Leader, November 1, 2006.
Dharisha Bastians, “Geneva II was more graceful” The Nation on Sunday, November 5, 2006.
Vindya Amaranayake, Where do we go from here? Interview with Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe, The Nation on Sunday, November 5, 2006.Future Talks with New Spirit and Approach Must Take Place Soon, National Peace Council, November 2, 2006.
B. Muralidhar Reddy, From bad to worse, Frontline, Volume 23 - Issue 22 :: Nov. 04-17, 2006.
The opening of Route A9 was one of the issues that broke the Geneva Talks two weeks ago.
Alternative route for Jaffna A-9 road, Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence, November 9, 2006.
Jehan Perera, Opening the A9 Highway can also open the road to peace, National Peace Council, November. 06, 2006.
The Supreme Court order on demerging the Northeastern Province remained in the news, with the Prime Minister asserting that the Supreme Court cannot be disregarded.
What have been the consequences of the escalation of hostilities?
Over 200,000 Sri Lankans displaced since April, says UNHCR, Colombo Page, November 8, 2006.
Francis Mead, Nutrition survey checks on health of children affected by conflict in Sri Lanka, UNICEF/ ReliefWeb, November 1, 2006.
Sri Lanka: UN official calls on all sides to protect civilians after deadly army shelling, UN News Centre, November 9, 2006.
See also, the National Peace Council's studies on the costs of war.
Some interesting developments including a statement by the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister on India's Sri Lanka policy.
Time for rethink on Sri Lanka: Karunanidhi, The Hindu, November 10, 2006.
Also:
Alok Bansal, Why India must act in Lanka, Rediff.com, November 1, 2006.
Lankan President to visit India, NDTV.com, November 4, 2006.
Maldives Boat Crisis and Demonstration, November 10, 2006
India need not worry, protests under control: Maldives, IANS/ TeluguPortal, November 9, 2006.
The story suggests that India's concern about the Maldives is that the political situation will create regional instability.
Other coverage of this week's events:
Maldives protesters cancel rally, BBC News, November 9, 2006.
Roy Mathew, Political storm brewing in the Maldives, The Hindu, November 9, 2006.
The story suggests that India's concern about the Maldives is that the political situation will create regional instability.
Other coverage of this week's events:
Maldives protesters cancel rally, BBC News, November 9, 2006.
Roy Mathew, Political storm brewing in the Maldives, The Hindu, November 9, 2006.
Thursday, November 09, 2006
Maldives Update: November 10 Rally Canceled
November 10 Cancelled!Minivan News, November 9, 2006.
Media Release MDP Call of 10th November Protest, MDP Press Release, (MDP/2006/PR-137) November 9, 2006. at(http://www.dhivehiobserver.com/MDP/pressreleases/MDP_Press_Release_0911200622.htm)
Media Release MDP Call of 10th November Protest, MDP Press Release, (MDP/2006/PR-137) November 9, 2006. at(http://www.dhivehiobserver.com/MDP/pressreleases/MDP_Press_Release_0911200622.htm)
Maldives Boat Crisis Update, November 9, 2006 (2)
Some of the people in the dhoni are reportedly being held in the island prison of Dhoonidhoo although whether all of them are there is not known. Some have been denied medication; a few were able to have access to their lawyers. They have still not been told why they are being held.
The Head (trustee) of British charity Maldives Aid, Mr. Tim Hardingham, is said to have been taken into police custody last night and there has been no news of him since. Unconfirmed reports say that he is being held at the Male International Airport. His family in the UK has not been told of any details of why he is being held or where.
This follows the deportment of two journalists, one an American working for Minivan News, and the other a British freelancer a few days ago.
RSF ‘Concerned’ Over Expulsion Of Foreign Journalists, Minivan News, November 7, 2006
The Head (trustee) of British charity Maldives Aid, Mr. Tim Hardingham, is said to have been taken into police custody last night and there has been no news of him since. Unconfirmed reports say that he is being held at the Male International Airport. His family in the UK has not been told of any details of why he is being held or where.
This follows the deportment of two journalists, one an American working for Minivan News, and the other a British freelancer a few days ago.
RSF ‘Concerned’ Over Expulsion Of Foreign Journalists, Minivan News, November 7, 2006
Maldives Boat Crisis Update, November 9, 2006
From this morning's papers:
Public concern grows over the fate of Addu boat hostages: Where the hell did Golhaa take them?
Dhivehi Observer, 9 November 2006.
A Day of Arrests, Minivan News, November 8, 2006.
Unusually, the establishment daily Haveeru takes cognizance of these events.
Coast Guard intercepts Addu protestors, Haveeru, November 8, 2006.
There still appears to be no other coverage of events in the Maldives during this eventful week.
Public concern grows over the fate of Addu boat hostages: Where the hell did Golhaa take them?
Dhivehi Observer, 9 November 2006.
A Day of Arrests, Minivan News, November 8, 2006.
Unusually, the establishment daily Haveeru takes cognizance of these events.
Coast Guard intercepts Addu protestors, Haveeru, November 8, 2006.
There still appears to be no other coverage of events in the Maldives during this eventful week.
Wednesday, November 08, 2006
Maldives Boat Crisis Update (6)
In the Indian Express:
Pranab Dhal Samanta, Concern in Delhi as Maldives braces for massive anti-govt protests on Friday, November 08, 2006.
Pranab Dhal Samanta, Concern in Delhi as Maldives braces for massive anti-govt protests on Friday, November 08, 2006.
Maldives Boat Crisis Update (5)
The increasing acrimony of the comments received by this blog reflect the urgency of the political contest in the Maldives.
This link was mentioned in one comment: Breaking news: People from Addu dhoni arrested after raid at sea, MaldivesToday, November 8, 2006. See also the Asian Centre for Human Rights Review article on the Maldives, 140/06, November 8, 2006.
The MaldivesToday report is being copied here:
Breaking news: People from Addu dhoni arrested after raid at sea
by MaldivesToday on November 8, 2006
By our correspondent in Male’
The dhoni from Addu which left for Male’ on Monday carrying people wishing to participate in MDP’s November 10 demonstration has been raided by the Coast Guard at sea and a number of people have been arrested and taken to the Coast Guard vessel.
Coast Guard first intercepted the dhoni early Tuesday near Huvadhu Atoll. Despite threats to sink the dhoni, the people refused to stop their journey. A Coast Guard vessel allegedly came near the dhoni almost capsizing the smaller vessel from the wake. On Tuesday, drama reached higher levels when Coast Guard prevented the dhoni from entering the harbour of Kolamaafushi island in Gaafu Alifu Atoll for refueling. A dhoni from Kolamafushi which came with food, water and fuel was prevented from reaching the Addu dhoni. The Addu dhoni had to anchor near an uninhabited island close to Kolamafushi.
The plight of the dhoni was communicated to the rest of the country through phone calls and SMS. As the case received publicity Coast Guard tried to cover up the case. Afzal, a Coast Guard official, appeared on television denying reports that the dhoni was attacked at sea. However, he claimed that Coast Guard will curb all ‘illegal’ attempts to reach Male’ for the November 10 demonstration. He said that the government has clearly stated that the planned demonstration is illegal and that it was the duty of the Coast Guard to assist the government.
The dhoni was allowed to travel later on Tuesday but Coast Guard resumed its bullying when the dhoni was traveling through Huvadhu Channel, the largest open channel in the Maldives, located between Gaafu Alifu Atoll and Laamu Atoll.
Coast Guard is believed to have raided the vessel near Thaa Atoll. People are believed to be injured because of the confrontation. Exact number of people who have been taken to the Coast Guard vessel is unknown. Previous reports say the dhoni was carrying 54 people including a few women and children.
Reports say that the people who have been arrested include some of the most leading activists from Addu Atoll such as Abdulla Rasheed (IC), Ahmed Zahid and Dhagada. Ameen Faisal, the President of the MDP Male’ ‘Dhaaira’, and Abbas Adil Riza, President of the Kuda Hennveyru cell of MDP, are two high profile politicians believed to be arrested from the dhoni. In fact, the reason why Coast Guard has been so determined to stop the dhoni is to apprehend those high profile activists and politicians before the November 10 demonstration.
The involvement of Huravee, a naval patrol vessel gifted by India to the Maldives, in the operation has caused much criticism of India’s policy of providing military assistance to the 28-year-old regime of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Critics say their fears that military assistance from India will be used to curtail opposition and suppress dissent have been proved right.
There are reports that the police are now searching in Addu for a number of other activists whom they think would organize resistance in Addu.
This link was mentioned in one comment: Breaking news: People from Addu dhoni arrested after raid at sea, MaldivesToday, November 8, 2006. See also the Asian Centre for Human Rights Review article on the Maldives, 140/06, November 8, 2006.
The MaldivesToday report is being copied here:
Breaking news: People from Addu dhoni arrested after raid at sea
by MaldivesToday on November 8, 2006
By our correspondent in Male’
The dhoni from Addu which left for Male’ on Monday carrying people wishing to participate in MDP’s November 10 demonstration has been raided by the Coast Guard at sea and a number of people have been arrested and taken to the Coast Guard vessel.
Coast Guard first intercepted the dhoni early Tuesday near Huvadhu Atoll. Despite threats to sink the dhoni, the people refused to stop their journey. A Coast Guard vessel allegedly came near the dhoni almost capsizing the smaller vessel from the wake. On Tuesday, drama reached higher levels when Coast Guard prevented the dhoni from entering the harbour of Kolamaafushi island in Gaafu Alifu Atoll for refueling. A dhoni from Kolamafushi which came with food, water and fuel was prevented from reaching the Addu dhoni. The Addu dhoni had to anchor near an uninhabited island close to Kolamafushi.
The plight of the dhoni was communicated to the rest of the country through phone calls and SMS. As the case received publicity Coast Guard tried to cover up the case. Afzal, a Coast Guard official, appeared on television denying reports that the dhoni was attacked at sea. However, he claimed that Coast Guard will curb all ‘illegal’ attempts to reach Male’ for the November 10 demonstration. He said that the government has clearly stated that the planned demonstration is illegal and that it was the duty of the Coast Guard to assist the government.
The dhoni was allowed to travel later on Tuesday but Coast Guard resumed its bullying when the dhoni was traveling through Huvadhu Channel, the largest open channel in the Maldives, located between Gaafu Alifu Atoll and Laamu Atoll.
Coast Guard is believed to have raided the vessel near Thaa Atoll. People are believed to be injured because of the confrontation. Exact number of people who have been taken to the Coast Guard vessel is unknown. Previous reports say the dhoni was carrying 54 people including a few women and children.
Reports say that the people who have been arrested include some of the most leading activists from Addu Atoll such as Abdulla Rasheed (IC), Ahmed Zahid and Dhagada. Ameen Faisal, the President of the MDP Male’ ‘Dhaaira’, and Abbas Adil Riza, President of the Kuda Hennveyru cell of MDP, are two high profile politicians believed to be arrested from the dhoni. In fact, the reason why Coast Guard has been so determined to stop the dhoni is to apprehend those high profile activists and politicians before the November 10 demonstration.
The involvement of Huravee, a naval patrol vessel gifted by India to the Maldives, in the operation has caused much criticism of India’s policy of providing military assistance to the 28-year-old regime of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Critics say their fears that military assistance from India will be used to curtail opposition and suppress dissent have been proved right.
There are reports that the police are now searching in Addu for a number of other activists whom they think would organize resistance in Addu.
Maldives Boat Crisis Update (4)
The ship carrying the people who were on the dhoni from Addu, is now entering Vaavu Atoll.
International observers and news media are already on the way to Vaavu Atoll now to get some first hand information. Are there any South Asian reporters in their midst? We will find out on this evening's news bulletins and tomorrow morning's papers whether Maldivians can consider themselves South Asians and whether South Asian identity is based on the solidarity of regional regimes.
In the meanwhile, the Dhivehi Observer in a report about this crisis carries a photo of the Indian-supplied ship with its new name, Huravee.
International observers and news media are already on the way to Vaavu Atoll now to get some first hand information. Are there any South Asian reporters in their midst? We will find out on this evening's news bulletins and tomorrow morning's papers whether Maldivians can consider themselves South Asians and whether South Asian identity is based on the solidarity of regional regimes.
In the meanwhile, the Dhivehi Observer in a report about this crisis carries a photo of the Indian-supplied ship with its new name, Huravee.
Maldives Boat Crisis Update (3)
Reports are that everyone aboard the dhoni has been handcuffed and taken on board the Huravee, formerly INS Tillachang. The Indian-supplied ship is headed north and it has been announced that the ship is heading towards Male.
Maldives Boat Crisis Update, 8-11-06 (2)
The Coast Guard is said to have boarded the boat, handcuffed and arrested people on board the dhoni. There is no word after that.
The Maldivian crisis raises anew a range of very old questions that states and citizens across South Asia need to consider:
1. Do borders delimit and limit our concerns about human rights and democracy?
2. Where is the threshold beyond which polite, international legal constraints about sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs do not apply, for clearly there should be such a threshold in international society?
3. Should considerations about such limits inform the decision to buy and sell arms, boats and other equipment that can have a 'dual-use' capability--against true marauders and against one's citizens?
The crisis also points to how government-controlled media can prove a liability to the government itself because their credibility is eroded over time. The result is that coverage of crisis situations is polarized to the point where everything one side says seems wrong to the other. In the argument over who is telling the truth, it is real people who fall between the cracks.
The Maldivian crisis raises anew a range of very old questions that states and citizens across South Asia need to consider:
1. Do borders delimit and limit our concerns about human rights and democracy?
2. Where is the threshold beyond which polite, international legal constraints about sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs do not apply, for clearly there should be such a threshold in international society?
3. Should considerations about such limits inform the decision to buy and sell arms, boats and other equipment that can have a 'dual-use' capability--against true marauders and against one's citizens?
The crisis also points to how government-controlled media can prove a liability to the government itself because their credibility is eroded over time. The result is that coverage of crisis situations is polarized to the point where everything one side says seems wrong to the other. In the argument over who is telling the truth, it is real people who fall between the cracks.
Maldives Boat Crisis Update, November 8, 2006
The boat is said to be sailing north.
In Suvadiv Channel, there is no mobile phone reception. The Coast is said to have waited till mobiles were out of rangeto harrass the people on the boat, using among other things the vessel donated by the Government of India. This stopped when mobile access was restored.
When the boat neared Thaa Atoll, it was being harrassed again. The Coast Guard circled the boat creating huge waves and the boat was struggling. The last report was that Coast Guard was trying to board the boat.
In Suvadiv Channel, there is no mobile phone reception. The Coast is said to have waited till mobiles were out of rangeto harrass the people on the boat, using among other things the vessel donated by the Government of India. This stopped when mobile access was restored.
When the boat neared Thaa Atoll, it was being harrassed again. The Coast Guard circled the boat creating huge waves and the boat was struggling. The last report was that Coast Guard was trying to board the boat.
Tuesday, November 07, 2006
Maldives Boat Crisis Update
Word is that the people on the boat have been told by the Coast Guard that they can travel anywhere but Male but the Maldivian police has warned them not to cross the Huvadhoo Channel. They are now in North Huvadhoo atoll near Kolamaafushi.
For a map of the islands: http://www.merriam-webster.com/maps/images/maps/maldives_map.gif
For a map of the islands: http://www.merriam-webster.com/maps/images/maps/maldives_map.gif
CRISIS: Maldives Update: November 6, 2006
A dhoni (boat) full of people heading from Addu to Male for the November 10, 2006 MDP demonstration has been stopped.
As they left Addu, they were allowed to embark. However, closer to Male, the dhoni was stopped by the Coast Guard, where were using an Indian-supplied search and rescue vessel. They sprayed hot water on the passengers in the dhoni and threatened to shoot them if they continued on. The passengers include women and children. The dhoni has taken shelter in a lagoon and has been anchored there since last night, with no food or water being allowed. At this moment the boat is still in the lagoon.
Coast Guard Threatens to Sink Boat, Minivan News, November 7, 2006.
The Dhivehi Observer has also just uploaded a report of this.
Will the political crisis generate a humanitarian crisis in this and other instances? It looks very likely. The time for ignoring events in the Maldives is long past.
PS: The comments section of this post debates the veracity of this report. In so doing, it illustrates the range of views in the Maldives today.
As they left Addu, they were allowed to embark. However, closer to Male, the dhoni was stopped by the Coast Guard, where were using an Indian-supplied search and rescue vessel. They sprayed hot water on the passengers in the dhoni and threatened to shoot them if they continued on. The passengers include women and children. The dhoni has taken shelter in a lagoon and has been anchored there since last night, with no food or water being allowed. At this moment the boat is still in the lagoon.
Coast Guard Threatens to Sink Boat, Minivan News, November 7, 2006.
The Dhivehi Observer has also just uploaded a report of this.
Will the political crisis generate a humanitarian crisis in this and other instances? It looks very likely. The time for ignoring events in the Maldives is long past.
PS: The comments section of this post debates the veracity of this report. In so doing, it illustrates the range of views in the Maldives today.
Monday, November 06, 2006
Sri Lankan peace process
Rohini Hensman, The Peace Talks have Failed: Long Live the Peace Process! The Lanka Academic, November 4, 2006.
The LTTE recently passed a law banning the recruitment of child soldiers.
Dilip Ganguly, Tamil Tigers say they have released 22 underage recruits.
Associated Press/ The Lanka Academic, November 5, 2006.
The LTTE recently passed a law banning the recruitment of child soldiers.
Dilip Ganguly, Tamil Tigers say they have released 22 underage recruits.
Associated Press/ The Lanka Academic, November 5, 2006.
Saturday, November 04, 2006
Celebrations of identity: 50 years since linguistic reorganization
In 1956, it was decided that language would be an acceptable basis for demarcating India's units and Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala were formed out of Madras State on November 1, 1956.
Last week, these states celebrated the 50th anniversary of their foundation.
Kerala celebrates golden jubilee Nov 1, PM to visit, New Kerala.com, October 27, 2006.
State’s golden fete set for grand launch, Deccan Herald, November 1, 2006. Bangalore to be Bengalooru, Herald (Goa), November 1, 2006.
Andhra Pradesh turns 50, shutdown in Telangana, Telugu Portal, November 1, 2006.
The event has elicited less comment and analysis than one would expect, but a few commentators this week have reflected on how linguistic states have fared.
Need for new vision, Deccan Herald, November 1, 2006.
U R Ananthamurthy, Kannada: Nothing exclusive, everything inclusive, Deccan Herald, November 1, 2006.
P. Venugopal, State up against new challenges, The Hindu, November 3, 2006.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Babble of Babel, Indian Express, November 2, 2006.
Even as Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka celebrate their anniversaries, each faces further irredentist identity movements. In Andhra Pradesh, the Telengana Rashtriya Samiti is the political face of the Telengana movement. The long-standing dispute between Karnataka and Maharashtra over Belgaum has resurfaced in the last year. At the same time, the four large southern Indian states have worked together on more than one occasion. Therefore, while a momentous political decision deserves acknowledgment, it is also important to reflect on the dynamic nature of such arrangements.
Units are demarcated not as an endorsement of universal truth but as a reflection of the politics of a particular moment. As those politics change, new demands necessitate adjustment in the form and jurisdiction of the unit. Whether celebrations of this anniversary will open up avenues for public debates on the terms of belonging to each unit and a new responsiveness to new demands or whether they will harden fluid identities into essentialist assertions, one can guess but one can also hope!
Last week, these states celebrated the 50th anniversary of their foundation.
Kerala celebrates golden jubilee Nov 1, PM to visit, New Kerala.com, October 27, 2006.
State’s golden fete set for grand launch, Deccan Herald, November 1, 2006. Bangalore to be Bengalooru, Herald (Goa), November 1, 2006.
Andhra Pradesh turns 50, shutdown in Telangana, Telugu Portal, November 1, 2006.
The event has elicited less comment and analysis than one would expect, but a few commentators this week have reflected on how linguistic states have fared.
Need for new vision, Deccan Herald, November 1, 2006.
U R Ananthamurthy, Kannada: Nothing exclusive, everything inclusive, Deccan Herald, November 1, 2006.
P. Venugopal, State up against new challenges, The Hindu, November 3, 2006.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Babble of Babel, Indian Express, November 2, 2006.
Even as Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka celebrate their anniversaries, each faces further irredentist identity movements. In Andhra Pradesh, the Telengana Rashtriya Samiti is the political face of the Telengana movement. The long-standing dispute between Karnataka and Maharashtra over Belgaum has resurfaced in the last year. At the same time, the four large southern Indian states have worked together on more than one occasion. Therefore, while a momentous political decision deserves acknowledgment, it is also important to reflect on the dynamic nature of such arrangements.
Units are demarcated not as an endorsement of universal truth but as a reflection of the politics of a particular moment. As those politics change, new demands necessitate adjustment in the form and jurisdiction of the unit. Whether celebrations of this anniversary will open up avenues for public debates on the terms of belonging to each unit and a new responsiveness to new demands or whether they will harden fluid identities into essentialist assertions, one can guess but one can also hope!
Thursday, November 02, 2006
Maldives Update: November 2, 2006
The acting president of the Maldivian Democratic Party has been summoned for question for the second time in three days. In the days leading up to the November 10th MDP demonstration in Male, the tension is mounting as the government seeks to pressurise the opposition leadership and the latter increases its efforts to disseminate information about its reading of the situation in the Maldives.
To keep track, see the Dhivehi Observer site, where today it is reported that Mr. Zaki was questioned on Monday at the infamous Dhoonidhoo Prison. The MDP's press releases are available here.
To keep track, see the Dhivehi Observer site, where today it is reported that Mr. Zaki was questioned on Monday at the infamous Dhoonidhoo Prison. The MDP's press releases are available here.
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
Sri Lankan talks: Article by Jehan Perera
This article was published on October 31, 2006 in the Daily Mirror, Colombo. If you are a subscriber it is accessible at http://www.dailymirror.lk/2006/10/31/opinion/01.asp.) It is reproduced here with the author's permission.
GENEVA FAILURE CALLS FOR NEW NEGOTIATION APPROACH
--Jehan Perera
The failure of the government and LTTE delegations to agree to anything, or to even meet again, comes as a very big blow to the expectations that people were having for peace, especially in the north east. The high cost of the military approaches of the two sides in recent times made the Geneva talks important as the quickest way to a less costly option of conflict resolution and easing the sufferings of the people. But unfortunately the inflexibility of the two sides scuttled that hope. Perhaps due to their mistrust, perhaps due to their insistence on sticking to their positions, they failed to deal with the main issue for which they should have been meeting, which was the interest of the people.
At the opening of the talks, Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim correctly summarized the three main issues facing the parties. He said these were the humanitarian issues concerning the people, stopping violence and a political solution. But at the talks the LTTE stuck rigidly to their position that the A9 highway to Jaffna had to be opened as the way to ensure humanitarian access to the people of the north and this was the only issue they wished to talk about. They did not wish to discuss any other issue other than that of the re-opening of the highway. On the other hand, the government took the position that the core issues relating to the political solution needed to be discussed at the talks.
With both parties taking up strong positions, and refusing to budge from their positions, the most important issues of humanitarian assistance to the conflict-affected people and ending the violence were not discussed. There are alternatives to the A9 highway in getting humanitarian assistance to the people of the north. Even if not as satisfactory as the land route, the government did supply the north with food and essential supplies by sea during the period 1995-2001 when the A9 highway was closed by the LTTE. The opening of the A9 highway would do little or nothing to ease the plight of the conflict-affected people in the east, which is far from the A9 highway. Addressing the issue of humanitarian welfare also includes upholding the Ceasefire Agreement in all its aspects.
It is also puzzling why the two parties could not agree to discuss the issue of the re-opening of the A9 highway, humanitarian assistance, the upholding of the Ceasefire Agreement and core issues as one package when they were meeting for two whole days. For instance, the government and LTTE could have agreed to talk about each of these issues for two hours each. If they could not satisfactorily conclude their discussions, they would have had a strong motivation to meet at an early date to take up the unfinished business. If problem solving was the real need, there was no need to get stuck on insisting on a one item meeting.
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
There is no question that talks that are meant to be successful should be within a framework, and not open ended. When talks are open ended with no agreed destination, the journey can go round in a circle. One of the reasons for the failure of the Ceasefire Agreement was because it was not located within an agreed political framework. Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim’s proposal at the outset of the talks, that they should be within the framework of the previous six rounds of talks held by the government and LTTE during the period of the UNP government and also within the framework of the last round of Geneva talks in February was in accordance with this reality.
At present there is little or no trust between the government and LTTE and other relevant parties, such as other Tamil parties and Muslim parties. Compounding this lack of trust is the political vacuum that exists in terms of an agreed political framework within which the ethnic conflict will be resolved. The lack of trust and lack of a political framework both explains and leads to the continuing efforts to obtain a position of strength vis a vis the others.
It is highly unlikely that there will be full adherence to the Ceasefire and Geneva Agreements until the government and LTTE agree on a broad political framework. The political framework agreement would set out the scope for economic development and political control. In other words, an end to the deadlock in political talks is necessary.
The government-UNP alliance may hold the answer to the need for a new approach to the peace process, to identify a satisfactory power sharing framework and to dealing with the LTTE’s approach to the peace talks. There is a need for the government to draw upon the expertise of UNP members, such as Prof. G.L. Peiris in fashioning a workable approach to negotiations with the LTTE that builds upon shared interests rather than on divisive positions.
It is also evident that the absence of the LTTE’s former chief negotiator, Dr Anton Balasinham from these talks contributed to the rigidity of the LTTE stance. Amongst the LTTE negotiators only Dr Balasingham would have had the breadth of vision to realize that peace talks cannot be sustainable outside of a political framework. It was during his stewardship of the LTTE negotiating team that the greatest breakthrough to a mutually acceptable political framework was obtained in the oft quoted Oslo Declaration of December 2002 that called for a federal solution that accepted the right of internal self determination in the north east of the country.
NEW APPROACH
It was unrealistic to expect a breakthrough at the Geneva talks. But it was reasonable to expect the two sides to agree to dates to meet again after putting across their different points of view on this occasion. But even this did not happen, making clear the fact that the two sides have a great deal of work to do to regain any measure of goodwill and trust in one another. In this regard the abiding memory of a successful charting of a new beginning would be the first round of talks that took place in Sattahip, Thailand in September 2002. Prof. G.L. Peiris led the government delegation and Dr Anton Balasingham led the LTTE delegation.
In their public statements to the media these two chief negotiators at the 2002 peace talks addressed the shared future they hoped to bring about through their meeting, rather than lay emphasis on the bitter and bloody past that divided them. When they faced a barrage of questions by skeptical journalists, they appeared to even defend each other. By way of contrast on this occasion the government and LTTE delegations appeared to follow the model that they had practiced at the last round of Geneva talks in February 2006. Both sides recounted the wrongs they perceived in the other side, while remaining silent about their own side’s misdeeds.
Unfortunately the government’s new alliance with the opposition UNP did not seem to have made any significant impact on the negotiating approach or spirit of the government team. But President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s decision to invite the UNP to join his government was born out of his recognition for a new approach to resolving the ethnic conflict. The President did not invite the UNP to join because he was feeling politically weak. On the contrary the President invited the UNP and signed the bipartisan agreement with them at a time he was, and remains, politically very popular amongst the majority of the electorate. The rationale for the President’s invitation to the UNP to solve the ethnic conflict now needs to be changed into action.
There is a case to be made for the UNP to become a formal partner in a power sharing arrangement with the government for a temporary period, until the framework of a political solution with the LTTE is agreed upon. There is a need for a new vision of partnership and goodwill in the peace process. There is a need for local and international pressure that would make the government give more sincere attention to pressing humanitarian issues and the LTTE to address core political issues instead to seeking to dodge them by making various excuses.
GENEVA FAILURE CALLS FOR NEW NEGOTIATION APPROACH
--Jehan Perera
The failure of the government and LTTE delegations to agree to anything, or to even meet again, comes as a very big blow to the expectations that people were having for peace, especially in the north east. The high cost of the military approaches of the two sides in recent times made the Geneva talks important as the quickest way to a less costly option of conflict resolution and easing the sufferings of the people. But unfortunately the inflexibility of the two sides scuttled that hope. Perhaps due to their mistrust, perhaps due to their insistence on sticking to their positions, they failed to deal with the main issue for which they should have been meeting, which was the interest of the people.
At the opening of the talks, Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim correctly summarized the three main issues facing the parties. He said these were the humanitarian issues concerning the people, stopping violence and a political solution. But at the talks the LTTE stuck rigidly to their position that the A9 highway to Jaffna had to be opened as the way to ensure humanitarian access to the people of the north and this was the only issue they wished to talk about. They did not wish to discuss any other issue other than that of the re-opening of the highway. On the other hand, the government took the position that the core issues relating to the political solution needed to be discussed at the talks.
With both parties taking up strong positions, and refusing to budge from their positions, the most important issues of humanitarian assistance to the conflict-affected people and ending the violence were not discussed. There are alternatives to the A9 highway in getting humanitarian assistance to the people of the north. Even if not as satisfactory as the land route, the government did supply the north with food and essential supplies by sea during the period 1995-2001 when the A9 highway was closed by the LTTE. The opening of the A9 highway would do little or nothing to ease the plight of the conflict-affected people in the east, which is far from the A9 highway. Addressing the issue of humanitarian welfare also includes upholding the Ceasefire Agreement in all its aspects.
It is also puzzling why the two parties could not agree to discuss the issue of the re-opening of the A9 highway, humanitarian assistance, the upholding of the Ceasefire Agreement and core issues as one package when they were meeting for two whole days. For instance, the government and LTTE could have agreed to talk about each of these issues for two hours each. If they could not satisfactorily conclude their discussions, they would have had a strong motivation to meet at an early date to take up the unfinished business. If problem solving was the real need, there was no need to get stuck on insisting on a one item meeting.
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
There is no question that talks that are meant to be successful should be within a framework, and not open ended. When talks are open ended with no agreed destination, the journey can go round in a circle. One of the reasons for the failure of the Ceasefire Agreement was because it was not located within an agreed political framework. Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim’s proposal at the outset of the talks, that they should be within the framework of the previous six rounds of talks held by the government and LTTE during the period of the UNP government and also within the framework of the last round of Geneva talks in February was in accordance with this reality.
At present there is little or no trust between the government and LTTE and other relevant parties, such as other Tamil parties and Muslim parties. Compounding this lack of trust is the political vacuum that exists in terms of an agreed political framework within which the ethnic conflict will be resolved. The lack of trust and lack of a political framework both explains and leads to the continuing efforts to obtain a position of strength vis a vis the others.
It is highly unlikely that there will be full adherence to the Ceasefire and Geneva Agreements until the government and LTTE agree on a broad political framework. The political framework agreement would set out the scope for economic development and political control. In other words, an end to the deadlock in political talks is necessary.
The government-UNP alliance may hold the answer to the need for a new approach to the peace process, to identify a satisfactory power sharing framework and to dealing with the LTTE’s approach to the peace talks. There is a need for the government to draw upon the expertise of UNP members, such as Prof. G.L. Peiris in fashioning a workable approach to negotiations with the LTTE that builds upon shared interests rather than on divisive positions.
It is also evident that the absence of the LTTE’s former chief negotiator, Dr Anton Balasinham from these talks contributed to the rigidity of the LTTE stance. Amongst the LTTE negotiators only Dr Balasingham would have had the breadth of vision to realize that peace talks cannot be sustainable outside of a political framework. It was during his stewardship of the LTTE negotiating team that the greatest breakthrough to a mutually acceptable political framework was obtained in the oft quoted Oslo Declaration of December 2002 that called for a federal solution that accepted the right of internal self determination in the north east of the country.
NEW APPROACH
It was unrealistic to expect a breakthrough at the Geneva talks. But it was reasonable to expect the two sides to agree to dates to meet again after putting across their different points of view on this occasion. But even this did not happen, making clear the fact that the two sides have a great deal of work to do to regain any measure of goodwill and trust in one another. In this regard the abiding memory of a successful charting of a new beginning would be the first round of talks that took place in Sattahip, Thailand in September 2002. Prof. G.L. Peiris led the government delegation and Dr Anton Balasingham led the LTTE delegation.
In their public statements to the media these two chief negotiators at the 2002 peace talks addressed the shared future they hoped to bring about through their meeting, rather than lay emphasis on the bitter and bloody past that divided them. When they faced a barrage of questions by skeptical journalists, they appeared to even defend each other. By way of contrast on this occasion the government and LTTE delegations appeared to follow the model that they had practiced at the last round of Geneva talks in February 2006. Both sides recounted the wrongs they perceived in the other side, while remaining silent about their own side’s misdeeds.
Unfortunately the government’s new alliance with the opposition UNP did not seem to have made any significant impact on the negotiating approach or spirit of the government team. But President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s decision to invite the UNP to join his government was born out of his recognition for a new approach to resolving the ethnic conflict. The President did not invite the UNP to join because he was feeling politically weak. On the contrary the President invited the UNP and signed the bipartisan agreement with them at a time he was, and remains, politically very popular amongst the majority of the electorate. The rationale for the President’s invitation to the UNP to solve the ethnic conflict now needs to be changed into action.
There is a case to be made for the UNP to become a formal partner in a power sharing arrangement with the government for a temporary period, until the framework of a political solution with the LTTE is agreed upon. There is a need for a new vision of partnership and goodwill in the peace process. There is a need for local and international pressure that would make the government give more sincere attention to pressing humanitarian issues and the LTTE to address core political issues instead to seeking to dodge them by making various excuses.
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